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INTRODUCTION 
 
    
   When on October 7 2000, Vojislav Kostunica was sworn in as president of 
Yugoslavia,it was the culmination of two weeks of dramatic developments. Results 
from the elections held on September 24 showed that Kostunica, the candidate of 
the 18-member coalition known as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, had 
defeated Pres. Slobodan Milosevic. The Milosevic government, however, was 
unwilling to accept defeat, claiming that Kostunica had not received a majority of 
the votes and that a runoff would thus be necessary. Citizens took to the streets; 
workers went on strike; and on October 5 protesters set fire to the parliament 
building in Belgrade. When it became clear that he was being abandoned by 
government agencies, including the police, Milosevic announced on October 6 that 
he would step down. Kostunica and his supporters then began to assume the control 
of key ministries and institutions and to undertake the governing of Yugoslavia. 
    According to John Cox
1
, the decision to extradite Slobodan Milosevic in 2001 to 
stand trial at the UN War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague -had indicted him on 66 
counts of genocide and other crimes, for his role in prosecuting ethnic cleansing 
and wars in the Balkans - marked an important turning point in Serbia‘s 
international prospects although it did little to end political instability within Serbia 
itself. The assassination only two years later in 2003 of the then Serbian Prime 
Minister, Zoran Djindjic, carried out by Serbian intelligence officers served to 
highlight the dangerous divides within and between Serbia‘s ruling political and 
security elites.  
    The election of Boris Tadic  to the Presidency in 2004, along with his 
commitment to EU integration, helped to ensure that by 2005 Serbia‘s political and 
international fortunes were looking better, aided in no small measure by the 
European Commission‘s decision to open negotiations on a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement—an important first step towards EU integration. However, 
the EU‘s subsequent decision to suspend talks on 3 May 2006 because of Serbia‘s 
failure to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), by capturing or identifying the whereabouts of former Bosnian 
Serb military commander Ratko Mladic, was a significant blow to Serbia‘s 
progress.  
   Meanwhile, Slobodan Milocevic died of a heart attack in 11 March 2006 at the 
UN detention center at The Hague. His death precluded a verdict in his four-year 
trial, leaving open wounds and dashed hopes that he would be held accountable for 
the death of more than 200,000 people. 
   On 21 May 2006 Montenegrins voted by 55.5% to 44.5% to terminate their three  
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year State Union with Serbia. The Union had been formed in 2003 from the break-
up of the former Yugoslavia with the option for both parties to leave after three 
years. Brad Blitz
2
 noted that nevertheless the result came as a shock to the people 
of Serbia, and their leaders, and added another layer of complexity to Belgrade‘s 
already turbulent political set-up. While Serbia‘s President Boris Tadic 
congratulated the Montenegrins, the Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica was 
unhappy with result. Montenegro's formal declaration of independence on 3 June 
2006 and Serbia's formal declaration of independence on 5 June ended what was 
effectively a loose political confederation.  
   Although tensions and differences between the Serbian President and Prime 
Minister pre-dated the referendum, the break with Montenegro aggravated existing 
grievances. It also served to shift the political focus away from everyday policies 
onto constitutional issues, personnel changes and elections, thus removing any 
residual momentum for internal reform which had already slowed following the 
EU‘s decision to freeze the Stabilization agreement.  
   In October 2006 Serbia agreed a new constitution by referendum. Over the next 
year Serbia faced further difficulties. On 26 February 2007 the International Court 
of Justice announced its ruling on Serbia‘s role in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The 
Court cleared Serbia
3
 of direct involvement in genocide during the war, but ruled 
that Belgrade had breached international law by failing to prevent the 1995 
Srebrenica genocide, and for failing to try or transfer the persons accused of 
genocide to the ICTY, in order to comply with its obligations under the UN‘s 
genocide convention, in particular in respect of General Ratko Mladic.  
   In the 2007 National Assembly elections, the nationalist Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) became the largest party in parliament, winning 81 of the 250 
seats.However, it was not able to form a government on its own. Consequently in 
May, a coalition government was formed that comprised the Democratic Party 
(DS) of pro-European President Tadic, the moderate nationalist Democratic Party 
of Serbia (DSS), the New Serbia (NS) party and the ―G17 Plus party‖. The 
coalition controlled 130 seats in all and the new government was led by Prime 
Minister Kostunica of the DSS. 
  Central to Serbia‘s political life in 2008 has been the status of Kosovo and its 
relationship with Serbia. The Final Status Talks on Kosovo to determine Kosovo‘s  
future governance arrangements started in Vienna in 2006 under the auspices of the 
UN.  During  the talks Serbian  negotiators  stuck  to  their  original position, as 
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outlined   in Serbia‘s amended 2006 Constitution,  that Kosovo4—which many 
Serbs regard as the cradle of their heritage and civilization—was entitled to 
substantial autonomy as an autonomous province of Serbia, but not full 
independence. With a negotiated settlement unlikely and Kosovan authorities 
threatening to issue a unilateral declaration of independence, Maarti Ahtisaari, who 
was chairing the negotiations, presented a proposal for the future status of Kosovo 
in February 2007.   
  The ―Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement‖ recommended a 
form of independence for Kosovo supervised by the international community. On 3 
April 2007, at the beginning of a debate in the UN Security Council, Prime 
Minister Kostunica declared that Serbia rejected the Proposal (following a vote in 
the Serbian legislature in February), and requested that a new mediator be 
appointed. On 5 April Ahtisaari's plan was approved by 100 of 101 votes cast in the 
Kosovo Assembly. In August 2007, after Russia obstructed the adoption of a 
resolution based on Ahtisaari's plan at the UN Security Council, a further series of 
negotiations began between the Serbian and Kosovo delegations, with mediation by 
the USA, the EU and Russia.  
    Ultimately, Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. A Resolution 
of the Assembly of Kosovo declared Kosovo a sovereign state independent from 
Serbia. The decision was based on Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 of 1999.  
   Serbia, with the continued support of Russia, immediately protested that the 
declaration of independence contravened international law and demanded that it be 
annulled. The NATO Kosovo force, KFOR, reinforced the border with Serbia, after 
the destruction of two border posts by Serb protesters and reports that Serbian 
security forces had entered northern Kosovo. Several states, including Albania, 
France, the USA and the United Kingdom, extended recognition to Kosovo on 18 
February, followed by others; Serbia immediately recalled its ambassadors based in 
those countries. On 21 February Serb protesters rioted in Belgrade, attacking 
several embassies, including that of the United Kingdom and the USA.  
   Tadic was reelected in February 2008. Shortly thereafter, Kosovo declared its 
independence, an act that Serbia refused to recognize. Tensions in the government 
over joining the EU, many of whose members had recognized Kosovo, led 
Kostunica (who objected to proceeding with EU membership) to resign, and new 
elections were called for May, 2008. Tadic's Democratic Party placed first, and 
after negotiations formed  a  government (July)  with  the  Socialists, who  favored  
entering  the EU; Democrat Mirko Cvetkovic became prime minister. One apparent 
effect of the new government's installation was the arrest (July) in Serbia of 
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Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader wanted on war crimes charges, 
and his extradition to the Hague. 
   Finally, Serbia is a potential candidate country for EU accession
5
 following the 
Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003. On 29 April 2008, the EU and Serbia 
signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the Interim 
Agreement on Trade and Trade-related issues . The SAA will be submitted to 
parliaments for ratification and the implementation of the Interim Agreement will 
start as soon as the Council decides that Serbia fully co-operates with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On 1 January 
2008, a visa facilitation and a readmission agreement between Serbia and the EU 
came into force. On 15 July 2009 the European Commission proposed to grant visa 
liberalization to Serbia. 
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POLITICAL   TRANSITION 
 
I. EVENTS PRECEDING  THE  ELECTIONS  
    A series of events occurred in 2000 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
following the presidential elections and culminating in the downfall of Slobodan 
Milocevic‘s regime on 5 October 2000. It is sometimes referred to as the 
'5th October Overthrow' and sometimes colloquially called as Bulldozer 
Revolution. 
   Prior to this, Milosevic was cracking down on opposition, non-government 
organizations and independent media. As the end of his first term in office of the 
president of Yugoslavia approached (he had previously been elected president of 
Serbia in two terms, from 1990 to 1997), on 6 July 2000, the rules of the election of 
the president were changed. Whilst the president of Yugoslavia had previously 
been chosen for one term only by the legislature, in the Yugoslav parliament, it was 
now to be directly elected via the two-round voting system of presidential elections 
with a maximum of two terms. Many onlookers believed that Milosevic‘s 
intentions for supporting such reforms had more to do with keeping his own power 
than with improved democracy.
6
 On 27 July 2000, the authorities announced that 
the early elections were to be held 24 September 2000, although Milosevic‘s term 
wouldn't expire until June 2001. The elections for the upper house of the federal 
parliament , as well as the local elections were also scheduled to be held on the 
same date. 
   Soon after the announcement, the anti-regime youth movement Otpor led the 
campaign to topple the regime and bring in a more democratic one. To have a 
unified opposition, eighteen opposition parties in Serbia formed the Democratic 
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, with Vojislav Kostunica as the candidate to 
confront Milosevic. Apart from this, two major opposition parties, Serbian Radical 
Party and Serbian Renewal Movement also had their candidates (Tomislav Nikolic 
and Vojislav Mihailovic, respectively), but the main battle of the elections was the 
one between Milosevic and Kostunica. The election campaign lasted for about two 
months, and was extremely tense, with numerous incidents, accusations of treason, 
independent media shutdowns and even murders. Ivan Stambolic, former president 
of the Presidency of Serbia, and former Milosevic‘s associate, but now a DOS 
supporter, was kidnapped and murdered by Special Operations Unit officers 25 
August 2000, one month prior to the elections. (In 2005, the court found that the 
order for Stambolic‘s assassination came from Milosevic.7) 
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II. PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTIONS 2000               
   The vote took place on 24 September 2000. The DOS coalition reported that 
Vojislav Kostunica won over half of the votes. The regime-controlled Federal 
Electoral Committee claimed that no candidate won over 50% of the votes and that 
a second round between Kostunica and Milosevic would take place. The vote was 
largely boycotted in Montenegro and by Kosovo 
Albanians. Yet, Milosevic officially won by large margin 
in these parts of the country. This obvious discrepancy 
and numerous irregularities made the accusations of a 
systematic election fraud stronger and have led DOS to 
call for peaceful protest to topple the regime. Some 
obvious irregularities could be found in the Federal 
Electoral Committee official results.   For example, the 
sum of the numbers of valid and invalid votes wasn't       Vojislav Kostunica 
equal to the number of voters; the sum of the  numbers of the voters voting at the 
polling stations and the voters voting at home exceeded the total number of voters; 
the sum of the numbers of the used and the unused ballot papers was short by         
117,244 in comparison to the number of eligible voters, the number of eligible 
voters was different from the one announced before the elections and has differed 
in the presidential, federal and local elections results, etc. All of these discrepancies 
provoked massive outrage. The results were declared false immediately after the 5 
October overthrow and the new official results were declared shortly afterwards.    
       
                                         
 
              
OFFICIAL  RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS 2000 IN SERBIA 
CANDIDATES NOMINATING PARTIES VOTES % 
VOJISLAV 
KOSTUNICA 
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION OF 
SERBIA 
2,470,304 50.24 
SLOBODAN 
MOLOSEVIC 
SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA 1,826,799 37.15 
TOMOSLAV NIKOLIC SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY 289,013 5.88 
VOJISLAV 
MIHAILOVIC 
SERBIAN RENEWAL 
MOVEMENT 
145,019 2.95 
MIODRAG 
VIDOJKOVIC 
AFFIRMATIVE PARTY 45,964 0.93 
TOTAL VALID VOTES (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
VOTES) 
4,778,929 97.19 
INVALID VOTES (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTES) 137,991 2.81 
TOTAL VOTES (TURNOUT)) 4,916,920 71.55 
ELIGIBLE VOTES 6,871,595 - 
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III. DEMOCRATIC   OPPOSITION OF SERBIA (DOS) 
 
   The Democratic   opposition   of Serbia (DOS)
8
 – formed    in January 2000 –  is   
a heterogeneous coalition both in terms of size and political platforms of its 
members. 
  Before the ousting of the previous regime on October 5, 2000, DOS was 
dominated by the Democratic Party (DS), the most numerous and influential of 
all.Parties united in DOS belonged to various ―political families‖: liberals, 
nationalists and socialists (more precisely: social democrats). It was a wide alliance 
of political parties and formed as a coalition against the ruling Socialist Party of 
Serbia and its leader, Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. Its candidate, Vojislav 
Kostunica, won the September 2000 federal presidential elections and the coalition 
won the provincial parliamentary majority in December 2000. The coalition then 
formed the government which ruled Serbia until December 2003.  
DOS was originally an 18-party coalition, including:                     
 Democratic Party (DS) (Zoran Djindjic) 
 Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) (Vojislav Kostunica) 
 Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) (Goran Svilanovic) 
 Demo-Christian Party of Serbia (DHSS) (Lladan Batic) 
 New Serbia (NS) (Velimir Ilic) 
 Social Democratic League of Vojvodina (LSV) (Nenad Canak) 
 Social democratic Union (SDU) (Zarko Korac) 
 Alliance of Hungarians from Vojvodina (SVM) (Jozsef Kasza) 
 Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina (RDSV) (Mile Isakov) 
 Vojvodina  Coalition (KV) (Dragan Veselinov) 
 Social democracy (SD) (Vuk Obradovic) 
 Movement for Democratic Serbia (PDS) (Momcilo Perisic) 
 Sandzak Democratic Party (SDP) (Rasic Ljajic) 
 League for Sumadija (LS) (Branislav Kovacevic) 
 Association of Independent Labour Unions of Serbia (ASNS) (Dragan 
Milovanovic) 
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and 3-party DAN  coalition:  
 Democratic Alternative (DA) (Nebojsa Covic) 
 New Democracy (ND) (Dusan Mihajlovic) 
 Democratic Center (DC) (Dragoljub Micunovic) 
  The interparty relations in the coalition started to deteriorate in 2001 when 
Kostunica's party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, pulled out of the coalition. The 
remainder has split into the Democratic Party and the G17 Plus group. 
    
 
IV. PROTESTS AND THE OVERTHROW OF SLOBODAN           
MILOCEVIC 
   The protest
9
 initially started with strikers at the Kolubara mines, which produce 
most of Serbia's electricity needs. The protest reached its height on 5 October 2000. 
Several hundred thousand protesters from all over Serbia arrived in Belgrade to 
protest. Unlike previous protests, there was no large scale police crackdown. The 
parliament was partially burned during the protests. 
  The protest is frequently named the "Bulldozer Revolution" after one of the most 
memorable episodes from the day long protest in which an engineering vehicle 
operator Ljudisav Dokic nicknamed Joe fired up his engine (actually neither an 
excavator nor bulldozer but a wheel loader, the event name is inaccurate out of 
convenience) and used it to charge the RTS building. Its tenant, Serbian state 
television RTS,had for a decade been a symbol and bastion of Milosevic's rule. 
When the RTS studios were taken over, the station was quickly renamed "Novi 
RTS" ("New RTS") as a sign that the regime had lost power. 
  Although the protest was mostly peaceful, without a larger escalation of violence, 
two people died. Jasmina Jovanovic fell under a truck, and Momcilo Stakic 
succumbed to a fatal heart attack. 65 persons were injured in the riots. 
  In the time between elections and the protest, Milosevic said that he would gladly 
resign but only when his term expired in June of next year. Due to pressure caused 
by the protests, Milosevic resigned on 7 October 2000. In the end even his ally 
Russia did not recognize his government. 
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THE TRIAL OF FORMER YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT    
MILOCEVIC 
 
   The Serbian Authorities arrested Slobodan Milosevic on 1 
April 2001 and he was transferred to The Hague on 29 June 
2001. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued three indictments against 
Milosevic
10
 for alleged war crimes committed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo accusing him of crimes 
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 
violations of the laws and customs of war and genocide. His 
arrest and detention was one of  ICTY's biggest achievements 
as he was the first head of state to face an international court 
since the Nuremberg Trials for the atrocities during World War II.  
   Meanwhile, in September 2001 an important development had been noted about 
the state of Serbia. After many years, the United Nation  Security Council lifts its 
arms embargo against Yugoslavia, abolishing the last remaining sanction by the 
international community. This marked a new beginning in the relations of Serbia 
with the NATO and especially the European Union since it wished to start the 
negotiations about it‘s  accession in the E.U. 
  His trial
11
 started on 12 February 2002 with the prosecution presenting its case 
against Milosevic for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo, with the case for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia following on 26 September 2002. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ( ICTY) prosecution 
finished presenting evidence against Milosevic on 25 February 2004. On 31 August 
2004, the trial resumed with Milosevic calling evidence in his defense. 
  Milosevic represented   himself  in his trial, and the trial was delayed many times 
due to his ill health. Because of this, in September 2004, the Trial Chamber 
assigned a defense counsel to represent him. Milosevic appealed this decision, and 
his appeal was upheld. However the Trial Chamber maintained the right to impose 
a defense counsel if Milosevic was unable to attend court. The trial was due to last 
four years (until 2006), but Milosevic died unexpectedly in custody on 11 March 
2006 of natural causes. His case was subsequently terminated. Milosevic's body 
was returned to Serbia where he was buried in his home town, Pozarevac. 
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ASSASSINATION OF ZORAN DJINDJIC 
 
Zoran Djindjic, (August 1, 1952 – March 12, 2003)      
was Serbian prime minister, opposition politician  and 
philosopher by profession. Djindjic played a 
prominent role in the Presidential elections of Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in September 2000 and in the 
October 5 uprising that overthrew the Milosevic's 
regime, and then led the broad-based 18-party 
Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition to a victory 
at the Serbian elections of December 2000. He became Premier of Serbia on 
January 25, 2001. He played a key role in sending former President of  Federal 
Republic of  Yugoslavia and Serbia Slobodan Milosevic to the UN War Crimes 
Tribunal in The Hague. However, Djindjic said that he became disillusioned with 
the protracted trial of Milosevic, and later condemned it as an expensive "circus". 
Djindjic said the court in The Hague was "allowing Milosevic to behave like a 
demagogue and to control the trial".  
   Djindjic was received favourably by Western nations. His meetings with western 
leaders George Bush, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and others strongly indicated that 
the West supported his politics. Djindjic had constant disagreements with federal 
president Vojislav Kostunica. On the other hand, he had a close relationship with 
Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic. The power struggle with Mr. Kostunica 
finally went Djindjic's way with the replacement of Yugoslavia by the union of 
Serbia and Montenegro over the past month. This left Mr. Kostunica without a job. 
Djindjic was assassinated
12
 in Belgrade on the stairway of the main Serbian 
government building on March 12, 2003. 
  The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was preceded by several 
unsuccessful attempts to end his life forcefully. Most notable was an attempt several 
days before March 12, 2003, a truck driven by Dejan Milenkovic, a known member 
of the criminal "Zemun Clan", tried to force the Prime Ministers car of the highway 
in New Belgrade. Djindjic escaped injury only due to the outstanding reaction of his 
driver and his security detail. 
  According to the official government statement, Djindjic was not conscious and 
did not have a pulse upon arriving at the emergency ward. He had made many 
enemies for his pro-Western stance, reformist policies which had seen 
unemployment rise to over 30%, for arresting Milosevic, for relinquishing him to 
the Hague, and for clamping down on organized crime. The murder was allegedly  
organized by Milorad Ulemek, an ex-Commander of the special police, also known  
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as Legija, who ordered Jovanovic to carry out the assassination. Legija was 
connected with the powerful Zemun clan of Serbian mafia, blamed for planning of 
assassination. Vojislav Seselj, ultra-nationalist and foe of  Djindjic, was suspected 
to have played a role in inspiring the assassination plot. 
  His solemn state procession and funeral on March 15, 2003 was attended by many 
civilians as well as by foreign delegations. Djindjic's death represented political 
and moral tragedy to many Serbs who saw in him a man who guaranteed 
coexistence with neighboring nations, integration to Europe and economic 
recovery. 
 
 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2003 
   Parliamentary elections were held in the Republic of Serbia on December 28, 
2003.The Republic of Serbia then was one of the two federal units of Serbia and 
Montenegro, formerly known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
   Serbia has been in a state of political crisis since the overthrow of the post-
communist ruler, Slobodan Milosevic, in 2001. The reformers, led by former 
Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, have been unable to gain control of the 
Serbian presidency because three successive presidential elections have failed to 
produce the required 50% turnout. The assassination in March 2003 of the 
reforming Prime Minister, Djindjic, was a major setback. 
   At these elections
13
 the former reformist alliance, the Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia (DOS), had broken up into three parts: Kostunica's Democratic Party of 
Serbia, late Prime Minister Djindjic‘s Democratic Party (now led byBoris Tadic) 
and the G17 Plus group of liberal economists led by Miroljub Labus. 
   Opposing them were the nationalist Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj and 
Milosevic‘s Socialist Party of Serbia (descended from the former Communist 
Party).At the time of the election, both Seselj and Milosevic were in detention at 
ICTY, Milosevic accused of committing war crimes, Seselj of inspiring them. 
  The remaining candidate was the monarchist coalition Serbian Renewal 
Movement-New Serbia (SPO-NS), led by Vuk  Draskovic was considered as part 
of the patriotic opposition: although an extreme Serb nationalist, he hates Seselj 
and is seen as more likely to support the reformist parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
13
 Republic of Serbia: Parliamentary elections December 2003, Report by TIME magazine 
 
14 
 
 
RESULTS  OF THE PARLIAMENTARY  ELECTIONS 
ON  28 DECEMBER 2003 
PARTY %  VOTES AMOUNT OF 
SEATS 
SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY  
(VOJISLAV SESELJ) 
27.61 82 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF 
SERBIA(VOJISLAV 
KOSTUNI-CA) 
17.72 53 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
(BORIS TADIC) 
12.58 37 
G17 PLUS (MIROLJUB 
LABUS) 
11.46 34 
SERBIAN RENEWAL   
MOVEMENT-NEW SERBIA 
(VUK DRASKOVIC-VELIMIR 
ILIC) 
7.66 22 
SOCIALIST PARTY OF 
SERBIA (SLOBODAN 
MILOSEVIC) 
7.61 22 
 
   Overall turnout was 58.8%, with the Serbian Radical Party winning most votes 
and gaining 82 of the 250 seats in government. The overall result
14
 of this election 
is that despite the great increase in support for the Radicals, the four pro-reform 
parties (DS, DSS, G17 and SPO-NS) won 49.8% of the vote, compared with 34.8% 
for the two anti-western parties, the Radicals and the Socialists, and won 146 seats 
to 104.  
  The high vote for the Radicals reflects partly the collapse of the once-dominant 
Socialists and the transfer of their vote to the opposite, but equally anti-Western, 
pole of politics, and partly the inflamed state of Serbian nationalist sentiment, 
which sees Serbia as the victim of a Western conspiracy following the loss of the 
Serb-inhabited areas within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the NATO-
led occupation of Kosovo. 
  On 3 March 2004, the Serbian Assembly voted in a new minority government 
comprising the DSS, G17 Plus and SPO-NS, with support in the Assembly from 
the SPS. Former Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica was appointed Serbian 
Prime Minister. 
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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2004 
 
 
   Serbia had been without an elected President since December 2002, when 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia inductee Milan 
Milutinovic's term ended. Two sets of elections in 2002 and a third in 2003 were 
declared invalid because voter turnout failed to reach 50%. However in February 
2004 (as a new state of Serbia-Montenegro –it is examined below), the Serbian 
Parliament removed the 50% minimum turnout requirement and on 27 June 2004 
the former Defense Minister Tadic was elected President with 53.97% of votes in a 
second round run-off
15
. His SRS opponent, Tomislav Nikolic, won 46.03%. 
 
RESULTS  OF THE  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTIONS  ON 27 JUNE 2004 
CANDIDATES NOMINATING 
PARTIES 
VOTES OF 2
nd
 
ROUND 
% 
BORIS TADIC DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY 
1.681.528 53.97 
TOMOSLAV 
NIKOLIC 
SERBIAN RADICAL 
PARTY 
1.434.068 46.03 
 
 
  Citizens in Serbia voted
16
 in majority for a program focused on peace, tolerance, 
reforms and above all European values and European integration of Serbia and 
Montenegro . The turnout was 48.29 % of electoral body, with undisputable 
difference of 247,460 votes in favor of Tadic. One must point out that the number 
of votes for Mr. Tadic doubled between two rounds. Having to choose between 
democracy and nationalistic populism, Serbian citizens opted for European future 
and not retrograde nationalistic propaganda. 
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SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: THE UNION AND THE END OF  
A   STATE 
 
  The union between Serbia and Montenegro
17
 was often referred to as being an 
unhappy marriage. On 4 February 2003, the name of the country changed from 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to "Serbia and Montenegro." Under the new 
Constitutional Charter, most federal functions and authorities devolved to the 
republic level. As a result, both republics already enjoyed substantial autonomy and 
many, especially in Montenegro, were eager to see the largely ceremonial State 
Union to end. The State Union could be seen as a product from the pressure of the 
international community and the EU in particular. In the aftermath of the breaking 
up of the former Yugoslavia, fears for further disintegration made keeping together 
the last pieces a priority. 
  The Politics of Serbia and Montenegro
18
 took place in a framework of a federal 
parliamentary republic, with a multi-party system. The President of Serbia and 
Montenegro was both head of state and, as chairman of the Council of Ministers of 
Serbia and Montenegro, head of government. Executive power was exercised by 
the government. Federal legislative power was vested in both the government and 
the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro. 
  On 21 May 2006 the referendum, closely followed by the international 
community, took place. Official results
19
 showed that 55,5% Montenegrins voted 
for independence and 44,5% against. This was just over the 55 percent threshold 
needed to approve the referendum under rules set by the European Union.        
  Although some questions can be raised about the campaign for the referendum, 
most democratic commitments for a referendum were met and the results were 
widely recognized. EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, congratulated 
Montenegro on a "successful referendum" and said the turnout of over 86 percent 
"confirms the legitimacy of the process." 
  With Montenegro independent, Serbia was forced to declare independence as 
well.This happened on 5 June at a low-key ceremony, which neither president 
Boris Tadic nor Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica attended. Reportedly, Serbia 
and Montenegro began their process of separation with a reshuffle of the army and 
a pull-out of soldiers. In October 2006, the Serbian population by referendum 
approved a new constitution for their ‗newly independent state‘, replacing the 1990 
constitution approved during the reign of Milosevic. 
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  The relationship between Montenegro and Serbia nowadays can be characterized 
as quite good. However, Montenegro‘s recognition of Kosovo that seems to be on 
its way could worsen the relationship between the two countries. 
 
 
SERBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, 2006 
 
   On October 1, 2006, followed by short negotiations among the largest 
parliamentary parties, the Parliament of Serbia unanimously adopted the draft of 
the new Constitution, with 242 MPs voting in favor. The other eight were not 
present. The draft was result of a compromise among the key political parties.    
  Some considered the way in which it had been drawn up to be fairly 
untransparent, and the result of political horse-trading. In the preamble, a statement 
that "Kosovo is an autonomous province of Serbia with significant autonomy" was 
included. It was decided that the constitutional referendum was to be held on 
October 28 and October 29. 
  All major political parties supported the draft and began a public campaign for the 
referendum. The only political bloc that campaigned against the draft and 
advocated public boycott was a group of liberal and social-democrat parties 
(Cedomir Jovanovic's Liberal Democratic Party, Nenad Canak's League of 
Vojvodina Social Democrats, Zarko Corac‘s Social Democratic Union, Natasa 
Mici‘s Civic Alliance of Serbia) and a number of NGOs. They objected to the lack 
of public discussion, argued that the claims to Kosovo in the preamble were a 
populist attempt to encourage the voters. Some were also dissatisfied with the level 
of autonomy given to Vojvodina. (On the 2007 election, those parties formed the 
coalition and entered the Parliament with about 5.3% support). 
  
 
 
The constitution 
   In the first article, Serbia is defined as a "state of the Serb people and all its 
citizens", and in the preamble Kosovo is defined as an "integral part" of Serbia with 
"fundamental autonomy". Also, it defines Serbia as an independent state for the 
first time since 1918.
20
 Among the constitution's 200 other articles are guarantees 
of minority rights, as well as human rights in general. It grants a form of self-rule 
for the province of Vojvodina. It also bans capital punishment and human cloning.        
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 In addition, it makes Cyrillic the only alphabet for official use, while making 
provisions for minority languages to be used at the local level.
21
  
 
Differences between the new constitution
22
 and that adopted in 1990: 
 Only private, corporate and public property is acknowledged; social assets 
cease to exist and shall be transferred to private. 
 Foreign citizens will be able to become owners of properties 
 Reappointment of judges 
 The President is the Commander in Chief of the army 
 For the first time constitution mentions "European values and standards" 
 Full independence is granted to the National Bank of Serbia 
 Decentralization process through granting ownership rights over municipal 
properties to local municipalities 
 Vojvodina is granted economic autonomy 
 Serbia has an official anthem 
 Rights of consumers, mothers, children, minorities are specially protected 
 Every citizen has the right to get information of public importance 
 Marriage is defined as the "union of a man and a woman" 
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PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2007 
   Following the dissolution of  Serbia-Montenegro state and the adoption of  a new 
Serbian constitution in 2006, parliamentary elections  took  place in Serbia on 21 
January. 
  Parties registering as ethnic minority parties did not need to surpass the 5% 
threshold to gain seats in the parliament, but instead needed to pass a natural 
threshold at 0.4%.For the first time in a decade, Albanian parties from the Presevo 
Valley participated in the elections, but Kosovo Albanian parties continued their 
boycott of Serbian elections. The 21 January parliamentary elections in Serbia 
provided a genuine opportunity for the citizens of Serbia to choose from a range of 
political platforms and were in line with OSCE
23
 commitments and Council of 
Europe's standards for democratic elections. Still, a few issues in the election 
legislation remain to be addressed.  
  The ultra-nationalist Serbia Radical Party (SRS) of Tomislav Nikolic continued to 
be the majority party with 81 seats in the Parliament but was unable to form a 
ruling coalition. The Democratic Party (DS) of Boris Tadic won 64 seats, the 
Democratic Party of Serbia-New Serbia (DSS-NS) of Vojislav Kostunica won 47 
seats and the G17 Plus of Mladan Dinkic won 19 seats. (the total turnout was 
60.62%) 
       RESULTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY  
      ELECTIONS ON 21 JANUARY 2007 
PARTY %  VOTES AMOUNT OF SEATS 
SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY 28.59 81 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY 22.71 64 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA-NEW 
SERBIA 
16.55 47 
G17  PLUS 6.82 19 
SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA 5.64 16 
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 5.31 5 
ALLIANCE OF VOJVODINA 
HUNGARIANS 
1.30 3 
 
  After negotiations, on 15 May 2007 the leader of DSS-NS Vojislav Kostunica  
sworn as a Prime Minister for a second term, just before the deadline for forming a 
ruling coalition would have required new elections. The new ruling coalition 
comprised three EU-oriented parties: the G17 Plus bloc, the Democratic Party 
(DS), and the Democratic Party of Serbia-New Serbia (DSS-NS) (130 of 250 
seats). 
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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2008 
   A pre-term presidential election was held in Serbia24 on January 20 and February 
3, 2008. Incumbent Pro-Western President Boris Tadic was reelected as President 
of Serbia in the second round with 50.31 percent of the votes cast, defeating his 
nationalist rival Tomislav Nikolic. So, Tadic won narrowly as the Serbs voted for 
more rapid integration in the E.U. The first round of elections was held on January 
20, 2008, when none of the candidates secured an absolute majority of the votes 
cast
25
.Thus, a run-off election took place on February 3, 2008 between Tomislav 
Nikolic of the SRS and Boris Tadic of the DS (the incumbent President) who 
finished first and second respectively in the first round. 
 
RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ON 3 FEBRUARY 2008 
CANDIDATES NOMINATING 
PARTIES 
VOTES OF 2nd 
ROUND 
% 
BORIS TADIC DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY 
2.304.467 50.31 
TOMISLAV 
NIKOLIC 
SERBIAN RADICAL 
PARTY 
2.197.155 47.97 
 
 The process was transparent and offered voters a genuine choice between distinct 
political perspectives. Turnouts were high for both the first and second round, over 
60 and 68 per cent respectively, the largest since the fall of the Milosevic regime in 
autumn 2000, demonstrating a significant level of public interest and participation  
in the democratic process. A revote of the second round was held in Dobro Polje 
due to some irregularities on 12 February 2008. Tadic was sworn in for his second 
term on 15 February 2008.  
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INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO 
 
     In an extraordinary parliamentary session in Pristina on 17 February 2008, 
Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia. Kosovo‘s prime 
minister Hashim Thaci read the declaration, which states that Kosovo is dedicated 
to ―peace and stability‖ in the region, and is looking for a ―good relationship‖ with 
its neighbours. 
    The declaration furthermore states that Kosovo is created along the lines of the 
UN plan drawn up by special representative Martti Ahtisaari, and calls for 
Kosovo‘s supervised independence by an international presence. All 109 deputies 
present at the parliamentary session voted in favour with a show of hands. The 
remaining 11 deputies, including representatives from the ethnic Serb minority in 
Kosovo, were absent. 
  Serbia remains heavily opposed to Kosovo‘s independence. Serbian president 
Boris Tadic reacted with a statement, saying that Belgrade will react with all 
―peaceful, diplomatic, and legal‖ means to annul the declaration of independence.  
  On 15 February, the Serbian government had already adopted a resolution calling 
any unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo ―invalid and illegal.‖ Some 
Serbs reacted emotional to Pristina‘s declaration of independence, taking to the 
streets to protest and attacking embassies in Belgrade of countries that recognized 
Kosovo‘s independence and several other buildings in the capital and posts along 
the new border. Serbian ambassadors stationed in countries which recognized 
Kosovo were called back, and president Tadic has argued in the UN Security 
Council that the unilateral declaration of independence of the province is a breach 
of international law, calling upon the Council to declare Pristina‘s actions as 
invalid. 
   Kosovo had long been a sensitive issue
26
. The Serbian government has always 
maintained that Kosovo should be kept within the Serbian state, while most 
Albanian Kosovars, who for a majority in the former Serbian province, wished to 
gain independence. From 1999, the international community controlled Kosovo, 
and its final status remained unclear. Ever since the end of the Kosovo Crisis in 
June 1999 the relation between Belgrade and Pristina remained tense. While in this 
crisis Albanians were victims of war crimes, after the peace settlements Roma and 
Serbians became the persecuted.  
   An estimated 200,000 people were driven from Kosovo. Pristina, which counted 
a Serbian population of 20,000 before the war, housed a Serbian population of 
about 700 at the beginning of 2000. In March 2004 interethnic violence, leaving 20 
dead, further harmed the relation between Serbia and Kosovo. At least 800 mainly 
Serbian homes and several Serbian religious buildings were destroyed or damaged.  
  The relation between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority in Kosovo has 
not improved much. The Serb community in Kosovo, like the Serbian government, 
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is strongly opposed to Kosovo‘s independence, and many Kosovo Serbs have 
claimed not to feel safe and to feel treated as second-class citizens in their 
homeland, a feeling they fear to worsen now that the province has seceded from 
Serbia. Similarly, former Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica repeatedly stressed that 
an independent Kosovo is not acceptable, because ―it would mean that violence, 
violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, and cultural genocide pay". 
   On 24 October 2005, the UN Security Council endorsed the start of the 
negotiations on the future status
27
 of the province. The UN identified six key areas 
which need to be addressed: improved living conditions of Serbs and better 
assistance for Serbs who want to return home, reform of local government, 
establishment of transparent and non-political security apparatus, strengthening of 
Kosovo‘s institutions, restructuring UNMIK28, and maintaining a safe environment.  
   In March 2007, UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari came with his final plan for the status 
of Kosovo within the region. Without mentioning the word ―independence‖ in his 
final plan, Ahtisaari did support a form of conditional independence for Kosovo. 
Kosovo would get its own flag and anthem, and would be able to become a 
member of important international organizations. 
   Immediately after Ahtisaari had presented his plan, Serbia reacted by stating that 
the proposed status of Kosovo was ―illegal‖ (Kostunica). The Serbian parliament 
rejected the plan by a large majority (255/270 seats). In a reaction parliamentarians 
condemned the plan as ―illegally laying the foundations for the creations of an 
independent state on the territory of Serbia.‖ UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, 
the EU Presidency and the US all accepted the proposal by Ahtisaari. 
  Consequently, the UN Security Council discussed the proposal. However, it has 
been unable to come up with any solution, as the members of the Security Council 
are themselves divided over the issue of Kosovo independence. The US has, over 
the past few years, consistently argued in favour of Kosovo‘s independence, and 
was the first state to formally recognize the new state on 18 February 2008. On the 
contrary, Russia and China, both also permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, are strongly against independence of Kosovo. Similarly, the Contact 
Group Troika that was installed on 31 July 2007 to mediate negotiations between 
Belgrade and Pristina was unsuccessful, with members of the troika themselves 
divided between those in favor (US, Germany) and those against (Russia) 
Kosovo‘s independence.  
   In the end, the Troika failed to meet its deadline of 10 December 2007. As soon 
as this became clear, the different actors started speculating on what to do after this 
deadline. Prime Minister Ceku of Kosovo stated that Kosovo would declare 
independence unilaterally if no agreement was reached. Serbia, in response, stated 
that it would by no chance recognize such a unilateral declaration of independence. 
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  As expected, as it was an crucial development which eventually led to the break-
up of the government, the declaration of independence played an important role in 
Serbia‘s presidential and parliamentary elections of 2008. In the presidential 
elections in February of 2008 both candidates were against independence for the 
province, however, they attached different importance to this for Serbia‘s relations 
with the EU. Tomislav Nikolic of the Radical Party argued against further EU 
integrations when the union would recognize Kosovo, whereas Boris Tadic argued 
that the two issues should be separated and that the Serbia should pursue EU 
integration regardless the union‘s position on Kosovo. 
  The international community
29
 remains divided over Kosovo‘s independence. 
Many countries were quick to recognize the new state, most noticeably the US, 
Albania, and a number of the bigger European member states such as France and 
Germany. Other countries, mainly those with restive national minorities of their 
own have declared that they will not recognize Kosovo as a new state. These 
countries include Russia, Spain, and a number of countries in the Balkan region.45 
countries have recognized Kosovo as an independent state, Colombia and Belize 
being the latest ones.  
   In the meanwhile the government in Kosovo has started issuing Kosovar 
passports. Twenty EU countries have announced to accept the Kosovo passport as 
an official document, whilst six EU countries, which do not recognize Kosovo as 
an independent state, have not yet made their position clear about the issue. 
Slovakia has announced not to allow entry. The new passport will replace the 
United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) passports which have been the official 
document
30
 since 1999 when UNMIK has been implemented.
 
  The situation in Kosovo is concerning the multi-ethnicity of the state remains 
worrying as it does not look like Serbians and Albanians are going to live with each 
other on short notice. Furthermore, the Serbian politicians in Kosovo are striving to 
establish parallel Serbian institution which certainly will not help the integration of 
Serbian community in the Kosovo society. 
  In September 2008 Serbia tabled a resolution for the United Nations General 
Assembly on the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. 
Serbia has refused to cooperate with the deployment of the European Union Rule 
of Law Mission in Kosovo, (EULEX). Serbia's intentions are quite clear: Serbia 
will never recognize Kosovo. 
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UN General Assembly Resolution  
  Serbia wants to turn the matter of Kosovo's independence from political to legal 
grounds. The tabled resolution seeks the International Court of Justice's opinion on 
whether or not Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was in accordance 
with international law. Serbia maintains that this action was a violation of the UN 
Charter because it did not respect the territorial integrity of Serbia. After a tense 
voting period in the UN GA, Serbia's resolution was passed. Almost all EU 
countries abstained.  
   This legal case will take one to three years to go through the International Court 
of Justice‘s legal system31. During this time, the Kosovo status question will be 
frozen as Serbia potentially gains candidate status, and thus more influence in the 
European Union. Also, the ICJ announced that the public hearings on the legality 
of Kosovo‘s unilateral declaration of independence will open on December 15st 
2009. If  Serbia can make this kind of progress and gain this influence while the 
International Court of Justice holds Kosovo in political suspension, then it will be 
all the harder to integrate Kosovo not only into the European Union, but into the 
international community as a whole.  
  Even if the International Criminal Court does decide that Kosovo‘s declaration of 
independence was not in accordance with international law, it still will not undo 
what has been done. The situation cannot go back to the former status quo. Kosovo 
can never go back to being a territory of Serbia. The only possible solution for this 
situation is for an independent Kosovo. 
 
 
European Union Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX)  
  Serbia has been in opposition to the European Union by not cooperating with its 
mission to Kosovo, EULEX.  Kosovo's territorial integrity is questioned by the 
UN-Serbia 6-Point Plan that has become the new European Union Rule of Law 
Mission to Kosovo (EULEX) mandate, against the wishes of Kosovo. Kosovo 
initially rejected the UN-Serbia Six-Point plan, which had been approved by the 
UN Security Council.   
   Serbia will only support a mission to Kosovo if it is in line with its demands 
regarding the deployment of EULEX. Namely: EULEX having a neutral stance on 
Kosovo's status, EULEX must have no connection with the Martti Ahtisaari plan 
for Kosovo independence and it only be deployed with the UN Security Council 
approval.The UN-Serbia plan calls for the creation of separate Serbian judicial 
customs and police systems in the northern, Serbian area of Kosovo
32
.  
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   Kosovo wishes for unconditional and full deployment of EULEX across the 
entire territory, supporting the Martti Ahtisaari plan. This new 6-Point plan 
breaches Kosovo's sovereignty and territorial integrity and would lead towards 
partition of the area. Serbia does not look at this as a partition of "Kosovo" because 
they do not see it as a partition of Serbia, according to Serbian Deputy Prime 
Minister Mr. Bozidar Djelic
33
. Prishtina has stated that it is unacceptable for 
EULEX to deploy to Kosovo according to Serbia's conditions. The EU has called 
on Kosovo leaders to accept the plan, as has the UN. Kosovo finally gave into the 
demands of the   international     community and   EULEX   began deployment
34
 in 
December of 2008.  
   Serbia‘s lack of cooperation and additional acceptance of a EU sponsored 
mission shows that Serbia is at odds with the EU. If Serbia wishes to become a 
member of the EU, then Serbia needs to have a more European perspective. Instead 
it holds a nationalistic one against the EU; Serbia will only cooperate on their own 
terms.  
   It is vital that Serbia recognize Kosovo. This is an irreversible process; Kosovo 
can never go back to being a region within the state of Serbia. The only solution to 
the problem of the status of Kosovo is for Serbia and the rest of the world to 
recognize its independence. Not only will this vindicate the actions NATO took in 
1999, but it will also be the only way to stabilize the region and all of Europe. 
Serbia has stood firm in its opposition to the EU and the UN: Serbia will never 
recognize an independent Kosovo. 
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SERBIA AND EUROPEAN UNION 
 
   To achieve its presumed goal of EU membership, Serbia must first overcome the 
unique challenges of its past. To much of the European public, mention of Serbia 
recalls images of the blood-soaked 1990s, and Serbs are still seen as the ―brutal 
ethnic cleansers‖ responsible for such atrocities as the Srebrenica  massacre of 
1995. In Serbia itself, memories of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign and the 
privations of UN sanctions have left many justifiably wary of Europe and the 
international institutions that represent it. The Serbia-specific terms of the EU 
conditionality process have only antagonized such feelings on both sides: the focus 
on apprehending war criminals has kept the horrors of the 1990s at the forefront of 
everyone‘s mind. This has often overshadowed the impressive economic gains and 
institutional reforms that Serbia has made since 2001. 
   Institutionally, Serbia has  been   preparing  itself for  EU
35
   integration and 
accession since 2001, when then-Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic put EU 
membership for Serbia on the top of the political agenda. During his short-lived 
government, (owing to his assassination by organized crime interests in March, 
2003) most of the institutional elements of EU integration were created and were at 
their most active.  
   These include the EU Integration Office of the Republic of Serbia, the Serbian 
Government Council for European Integration (to be headed by the Prime Minister 
himself,) and the Parliamentary European Integration Committee. When the EU 
opened negotiations with Serbia for the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) in October 2005, an EU negotiating team was formally created, to be 
headed by the Deputy Prime Minister.  
    It is however, a measure of the decreased importance that recent governments 
have placed on EU integration that this team has had three different Chief 
Negotiators in the less than two years since its founding. In economic terms, Serbia 
and the EU are already closely intertwined, and this integration is likely to increase 
in the future regardless of closer political ties. The EU already accounts for more 
than 50% of Serbia‘s exports and imports, a result not only of geography but also 
of numerous trade preferences granted by the EU since 2000. 
   In recent years, Serbia has been one of the fastest growing economies in the 
region, expanding at a 7.0% clip in 2007. This has been driven by high foreign 
investment, overwhelmingly from countries of the EU, which has far and away 
become the biggest investor in Serbia. Regional economic integration can also be 
expected to continue with the creation of – and Serbia‘s inclusion in – the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in July 2007. This agreement creates a 
customs and border-free economic zone amongst the economies of Central Europe, 
and should   be   successful   in  tying    Serbia    closer   not   only to  its   Balkan 
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neighbours, but to the EU  members  in the region as well.  Put solely in terms of 
economic logic, closer integration with the EU is Serbia‘s only sensible option.        
  However, the political situation in Serbia cannot be quantified nearly as 
easily.The ultra nationalism that tore apart Yugoslavia in the 1990s continues
36
 to 
be a potent political force. Though the country has been governed by a moderate, 
pro-European coalition from 2000 on, the far right-wing Radical Party has 
performed extremely well at elections – in 2003 it held a plurality and in May 2008 
it won no less than 29.46% of the vote. The status of Kosovo has been a major 
factor in this recent success: backed by all of the major governments of the EU, 
Kosovo‘s independence is still seen as unacceptable by the vast majority of 
Serbia‘s population.  
    The sensitivity of this issue should not be downplayed: a poll in the study found 
that 30% of respondents would favor terminating relations with the EU entirely if 
the EU unilaterally supported Kosovo‘s independence37. This figure roughly 
corresponds with the strength of the Radical Party and is further evidence of the 
significant role that extreme nationalism continues to play in Serbian public 
life.This tide from the past has been very difficult for pro-European Serbian 
politicians to overcome. Though they have been generally successful, their 
arguments have been based almost entirely on economic grounds. 
    This is not without reason  a good  example of the tangible economic benefits of 
closer cooperation with the EU is the decision of Fiat, the Italian automotive 
company, to make considerable investment in the Kragujevac Zastava factory.The 
decision was made, not coincidentally, the day after Serbia signed the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (29 April 2008). 
   However, despite such apparent gains, economic arguments still only rarely 
alleviate the passionate appeals of the far-right. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
the EU can be presented as the only rational way by which all Serbs can once again 
live under the same entity. How such an appeal might be received is hard to say, 
but its approach does at least take into account and attempt to redress some of the 
nationalist grievances. The victory of pro-European parties in the May 2008 
elections (it is examined below) is particularly important. Running under the 
umbrella coalition organization, ―For a European Serbia ‖ these parties won a 
plurality with 38.42% of the vote. They are, however, in an awkward coalition with 
the Socialists, Milosevic‘s former party which has not entirely broken ties with its 
past. 
   The  strength  of  the   far-right  continues  with  the   success  of  the  Radical  
Party, which won 29.46% - the largest of any single party. For its part, the EU 
reinforced its commitment  to  the membership perspective of  Serbia by signing 
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the Stabilization and   Association   Agreement (SAA)     with   the   country  on     
April    29,    2008    in Luxemburg  just prior to parliamentary elections in May.     
  The aim was to exert leverage on the outcome of the elections in favor of the pro-
European Democratic Party, which was able to form a governing coalition, and 
nevertheless the actual implementation of the SAA was made conditional upon the 
full cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY. In light of these developments, the arrest 
(July 2008) of former Bosnian Serb general Radovan Karadzic and his subsequent 
extradition to the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague also do not seem 
to be a coincidence. 
   His arrest also underscores the  point that political  processes in the  country   will 
continue to determine the course of its relationship with the EU.   For over a 
decade, Karadzic, under a false name and identity, was able to walk the streets of 
Belgrade freely, many assumed with the complicity of some segments of the 
Serbian government. However, the political course pursued by the new coalition 
seems to be a reflection of EU leverage on the political agenda of the country. With 
the tangible implementation of the SAA in sight, the EU‘s insistence on full 
cooperation with the ICTY has managed to push the political elite toward action.  
  Nevertheless full implementation of the SAA will probably still be contingent on 
the capture of the still-at large fugitive general  Ratko Mladic (and that of Goran 
Hadzic), Karadzic‘s wartime ally. In any case, were this to occur and the accession 
process to move forward, the survey attempts to create a best case scenario as to a 
future accession date. Looking at the average time that other countries have taken, 
were Serbia to implement the SAA in 2009, it could look at membership sometime 
around 2017. This is, of course, dependent on the other factors that have been 
previously discussed. If pro-European forces – supported seemingly by the 
majority of the Serbian population – can continue to have success, the accession 
process can be expected to continue smoothly and successfully. If not, and the 
powerful nationalist undercurrent of Serbian politics is revitalized, there could be 
many road bumps in the path ahead.  
    Unfortunately, a European future for Serbia is still far from inevitable. Over the 
last year there has been progress in Serbia‘s European integration process and the 
European Commission
38 
 noted in its Annual Progress Report for Serbia that in 
light of sustained cooperation with ICTY. In this context the Commission considers 
that the Interim Agreement should now be implemented by the EU, followed by the 
full implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).  
   The Annual Report notes
39
 that Serbia needs to continue its efforts to carry out 
and implement EU related reforms and to fully commit itself to the path of 
European Integration. The EU has for its part shown clear support for these efforts 
by earmarking substantial financial  assistance ¬1 billion for the period of 2007-
2011 and additional ¬200 million of micro financial assistance. 
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    The EU is also supporting efforts to bring Serbian people closer to the EU by 
finalizing the visa liberalization process. The European Commission encourages  
Serbia to meet the outstanding benchmarks to ensure the endorsement of the 
Commission's  proposal  by  the member states  and  thus  make  visa  free  travel  a 
reality by 1 January 2010. 
   The country faces, at the same time, the difficult requirements of accelerating 
economic reforms and ensuring sustainability in the public finances. Concerning 
other challenges, the Progress Report states that the country needs to make further 
progress in a number of areas
40
, including the effective implementation of existing 
laws; the improvement of public consultation prior to the adoption of laws; the 
reform of the judicial system and in reinforcing its capacity to fight against 
corruption. Furthermore there continue to be concerns about incidents of  
intimidation of civil society activists, human rights defenders and journalists that 
are not fully investigated and where the perpetrators are not brought to justice. 
Serbia needs to demonstrate       a more    constructive   attitude   on     regional    
co-operation and issues related to Kosovo.     
    Together with Serbia the European Commission
41
 adopted its annual strategy on 
EU enlargement and the progress reports for the candidate and potential candidate 
countries.      
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OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES 
 
 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION
42
 
 
   The Milosevic years not only lacked economic reforms, moreover a system of 
cronies and criminals who plundered the country‘s hard currency reserves and 
much of the country‘s material wealth, was established. Though commitments are 
made against organized crime, still mafia has influence in nowadays Serbia. 
   A major impetus to cleaning up the system from corrupted criminals associated 
with Slobodan Milosevic‘s regime was operation Sabre. Following the murder on 
prime minister  Djindjic, this comprehensive action led to dismantling of key 
organized crime channels and in resolving previously unsolved high profile cases, 
including murders, abductions and political assassinations. More than 4,000 people 
were arrested. 
  Despite the fact that special legislation has been adopted in 2002 and a special 
prosecutor for the fight against crime was appointed in 2003, the practical 
implementation is problematic. The main problem is a lack of resources and limited 
staff. In December 2005 the Serbian Parliament adopted its first anticorruption 
strategy. According to this strategy an action plan will be drafted which includes 
deadlines to be met in the fight of corruption. An independent panel will be 
established to supervise implementation of the strategy. It seems that the plans to 
fight organized crime and corruption started to pay off in 2006. In January a major 
action was taken to uncover corruption in the National Bank. The vice-governor 
and former vice governor were arrested. Both men are also top figures from the 
Socialist Party, until recently the party of Milosevic. 
   In February 2006 Serbian police issued a warrant for Bogoljub Karic, after he 
failed to appear in court for questioning. The Karic family is famous for using 
political connections to grow enormously rich. Bogoljub Karic, a friend and 
business partner of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, heads the 
Power of Serbia Movement and used to be the owner of the telecommunications 
company Mobitel. Karic and his brothers are searched to face charges of tax 
evasion, mismanagement of millions of dollars and money laundering. Karic 
accused Prime Minister Kostunica of prosecuting him for political reasons, because 
of the popularity of his party. The Serbian Strength Movement ranked third in 
opinion polls and was ahead of Kostunica's party. This was also one of the reasons 
for the small Social Democratic Party to sign a co-operation agreement with Karic, 
in October 2005. Currently he is hiding abroad, rumors say in Russia, and ever 
since his party dropped in the polls. At the January 2007 elections, the party did not 
gain any seats in parliament. 
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    In April 2006 according to Serbian former Finance Minister Mladjan Dinkic the 
strongest blow to organized economic crime and corruption in Serbia since the fall 
of former President Slobodan Milosevic took place as Serbian police have detained 
nine people, including two judges, as part of an investigation into government 
corruption and organized crime. 
    In June 2006 the Serbian government came under strong criticism over the 
killing of a protected witness in the Zoran Djindjic assassination trial. Interior 
Minister Dragan Jocic, claimed that the witness‘s death was a "showdown within a 
criminal gang". He also suggested that the witness was to blame for his own death 
by refusing to be included in a witness protection programme. However, Serbia's 
opposition Democratic Party (DS) said Jocic has failed to deal with organized 
crime in the country, and demanded his resignation. 
    In recent years Serbia has made further commitments in fight against organized 
crime and in close cooperation with OSCE
43
 the Serbian government has dedicated 
itself to strengthen its legislative framework and the capacity of judges and 
prosecutors. This is very important in order to fight organized crime effectively. In 
addition, close relations have been developed between prosecutors in Serbia and 
Italy‘s anti-mafia Directorate. Miljko Radisavljevic has been appointed as special 
prosecutor for organized crime. 
    The level of corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception of 
Transparency International, an international NGO that fights corruption globally. In 
2007 Serbia scored a 3,4 (on a scale from 1-10, with 1 means highly corrupt) on 
this index. This is not a great score, however, compared to the region and the past 
scores this is not bad. 
    According to Transparency International, Serbia is making progress in fighting 
corruption: in 2002 the country scored only 2,3 and was therefore the most corrupt 
country in the Balkan region. In 2008 Serbia has improved its position, both in 
absolute score as in the relative position compared to the other countries in the 
region. 
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CO-OPERATION WITH ICTY 
 
 
   The International Criminal Tribunal
44
 for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was 
established in May 1993 in the Hague  and all UN members are obliged to co-
operate fully with it. It has jurisdiction over individuals responsible for war crimes 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 
   In the past, willingness to co-operate with the Tribunal has been far from 
accepted by the Serbian people and the government. This bad co-operation with the 
Tribunal has been blocking the Serbian European integration process for quite 
some time. 
  However, the  arrest, on 21 July 2008, of Radovan Karadzic who is accused of 
war crimes has changed the situation dramatically.(of course in 2001 there was 
another arrest by ICTY  that of Milocevic, accusing him for crimes against 
humanity in Yugoslav war of early 90‘s) The arrest was welcomed greatly in US 
and the EU and the EU enlargement Commissioner argued that the arrest of 
Karadzic is ―milestone in Serbia‘s co-operation with the Hague45 Tribunal‖. It seem 
that the new Serbian government has decided to capture the suspects hiding in 
Serbia.  
   The two remaining war crimes fugitives are Goran Hadzic and the former 
General of the Bosnian Serbs army Ratko Mladic. According to several sources, 
the Serbian secret police is closing the lines behind the two and their arrest can 
perhaps be expected on short notice. These positive developments will certainly 
help the country on its path towards the EU and can further stabilize the region. 
   Perhaps different then expected by some analyst, the arrest of Karadzic did not 
lead to a political crisis in Serbia. The demonstration in Belgrade, which was 
organized by the Serbian Radical Party and took place just hours before Karadzic 
was handed over to the International Criminal Tribune for the former Yugoslavia in 
the Hague, was smaller than initially expected as only 15.000 people gathered to 
show their support to Karadzic. The protesters were singing nationalist songs and 
waving posters of their "Serbian Hero‖. Some of them, mainly young soccer 
hooligans and activists from the Obraz ultra-nationalist group started rioting. 
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PARLIAMENTARY  ELECTIONS   2008 
 
 
   By March 2008 the coalition government created in May 2007 was in difficulty, 
with the nationalist Prime Minister Kostunica of the DSS and the new President 
Tadic of the DS unable to forge a common position on Europe after Kosovo‘s 
declaration of independence on 17 February. The disagreements between 
Kostunica and Tadic predate the Kosovo declaration but the decision of 22 EU 
Member States to recognize Kosovo made the issue of closer ties to the EU the 
issue which challenged the already fragile coalition.
46
 While both parties stood 
firmly against Kosovo‘s independence they differed on the issue of whether this 
should influence Serbia‘s quest for EU membership.47 In March Prime Minister 
Kostunica resigned and President Tadic called early  elections
48
  for 11 May 2008.    
  The election campaign was dominated by the issues of Kosovo, the EU and  the 
Government‘s previous record. 
 
 
RESULTS  OF  THE  PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS  ON  11  MAY 2008 
PARTY %  VOTES AMOUNT OF SEATS 
    (TOTAL  250)         
DEMOCRATIC PARTY COALITION: 
DS,G17 PLUS, SPO, SPD 
AND LSV 
38.4 103 
SERBIAN RADICAL PARTY (SRS) 29.5 77 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA(DSS) 
AND NEW SERBIA 
11.6 30 
SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA (SPS)   AND 
UNITED SERBIA(PUPS-JS) 
7.6 20 
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) 5.2 13 
HUNGARIAN COALITION (MK) 1.8 4 
COALITION LIST FOR SANDZAK (SDA) 0.9 2 
COALITION OF ALBANIANS FROM F 
PRESEVO VALLEY (KAL) 
 
0.4 1 
 
    The turnout (including Serbs voting in Kosovo) was 61.35%. Following a 
number of complaints submitted by the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the electoral 
commission announced that voting was to be repeated in three constituencies on 18 
May, owing to  irregularities .The results showed an increase in parliamentary 
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representation for pro-EU, pro-reform parties and a  corresponding  decline in the 
number of deputies  from the more radical and nationalist parties. So, the May 
2008 elections in Serbia showed that the majority of the voters
49
 opted for 
European integration. 
    However, difficulties in   forming the government in the period   after the 
elections   proved that Serbian society is still highly divided. The polarization 
between pro-Europeans and traditionalists became so intense that it provided a 
coalition potential to Milosevic‘s Socialist Party of Serbia that even they did not 
expect. After an exhausting period of negotiations the Socialists decided to join the 
pro-European bloc, for the time-being. Neighbouring states, the EU and the USA 
welcomed the election results (which had followed predictions of success for the 
SRS) and urged the rapid formation of a new administration.
50  
Despite the success 
of the DS-led bloc in the May elections, its ability to form a government was not a 
forgone conclusion. 
   Following the elections the major parties were engaged in lengthy coalition talks 
before a coalition government was finally formed on 7 July 2008.  There was 
speculation that Kostunica‘s DSS might be able to form a nationalist and anti-EU 
coalition government with the Radicals (SRS) of Tomislav Nikolic   and the 
Socialists (SPS) of Ivica Dacic. However, something like this never had been 
happened and  the coalition of this new pro-European government  is made up of 
the Democratic Party (DS) under the leadership of Tadic, the Socialist Party of 
Serbia(SPS)  led by Dacic, and G17 PLUS under Dinkic.  Former Economist Mirko 
Cvetkovic, who is not a member of any party, but   who is close to the DS Party, 
was appointed as Prime  Minister
  
while  the other ministries have been shared out 
between the coalition parties. 
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PARTY   SYSTEM OF  SERBIA 
 
      
   The party system in Serbia does little to help the already beleaguered 
parliament.It is a system defined as ―polarized pluralism,‖ characterized by a 
moderate, centrist party – in Serbia‘s  case the DS – which has   to fight  off 
opposition from both extremes of the political spectrum. In such a system, the  
opposition  parties   often find themselves closer to  the  ruling  parties  than  to 
another.  This can lead  both   to a  divided opposition as well as to awkward 
coalitions such as the current association of the pro-European center with the 
remnants of the SPS.  
   There are also numerous anti-system parties, which are unconvinced of the merits 
of democracy despite their position in a democratically-elected parliament. The 
best example of this is the right-wing nationalist Radical Party, which in the period 
since transition has electorally perhaps been Serbia‘s most consistently successful 
party. Perhaps the biggest failing of the party system, however, is the fact that the 
parties themselves have neither been institutionalized  nor become firmly rooted in 
society. More often than not they are simply the ―parties of leaders.‖ An important 
characteristic of party leaders in Serbia is ‗the personalization of politics‘. In this 
‗hunt for voters‘, the leader himself is the symbol, message and programme. 
      According to Sartori
51
, in places where the party system is not structured the 
predominant determinant of  electoral  behaviour is related to the reputation and 
authority of a person, and we have a situation of voting for a person rather than for 
a party.
 
This leads to great electoral volatility which leads to exaggerated promises 
on behalf of candidates who all too often have no grounded base of support. When 
these promises go unfulfilled, the frustration of the public with politics and the 
parliament continues to rise. Despite the weakness of parliament, however, a 
historic break with the past was achieved in 2006 with the passing of a new 
constitution for the Republic of Serbia. 
     What had previously seemed impossible quickly became reality on June 6th, 
when Montenegro withdrew from the State Union. Basic human rights, individual 
and collective, were embraced in line with European standards. Social ownership – 
the mechanism for the blatant nationalization and robbery of Serbian citizens 
during the Milosevic years – was abolished and private property 
embraced.Executive power was constrained in some ways, though it still remains 
the dominant force in political life and the constitution is not without its 
disadvantages, but it is important as a symbolic step towards a new political order. 
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   After adopting   the  new constitution in 2006, the party system
52
 has  entered a  
more stable  phase   but  the  unresolved issue of  Kosovo‘s  status remains and 
question about future  relations toward membership in NATO are still open 
because the SRS,SPS and DSS have some reservations, making this process 
somewhat uncertain. The party system in   Serbia changed in  the   1990–2008 
period,   primarily as  a consequence of the results of the eight  parliamentary 
elections called in that time: 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007,2008.  An 
important trait  of   all these elections is that there were major oscillations in the 
strength of all the parties, indicating the weakness of both the parties and the party 
system. 
    One could quantify these oscillations in terms of ‗total electoral volatility‘, 
which means the percentage of votes which ‗went from one party to the other‘ 
compared with the previous elections. This high level of fluctuation of the 
achievement of parties at elections is not however only typical of Serbia
53
. 
   In a socially non-established party system where, apart from the parliamentary 
elections in 2007, political themes dominated instead of economic– social ones, it 
is difficult to count on stable support and party identification. The inconstancy and 
instability of the electoral body are considerably reduced when seen through the 
prism of party blocs (bloc volatility, Bartolini and Mair) because in this way it is 
almost obvious that voters oscillate among similar parties and very little among 
distant parties. Good examples are the DS-G17 PLUS, DS-DSS, DS-LDP and SPS-
SRS. The best example is that the SRS almost absorbed the SPS after 2000. 
    There is a problem of measuring the coalitions. We treated a coalition as one 
party. As it  is noted above, in almost all parties in Serbia there are leadership 
tendencies and the ambition  of   the party  leader to  accumulate  as  much 
authority as  possible for making key political and personnel decisions, as well as 
to accumulate and distribute party power
54
. 
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Framework  of  party  system 
 
 
    Changes  to  the state‘s borders  (SFRY, FRY, Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia)  
also changed the framework and nature of party competition. We shall regard the 
party system
55
 as ‗the network of competitive relationships between political 
parties‘, through the influences of institutional elements and social structures, 
primarily of social cleavages. The electoral system in Serbia was created in 1992 
with the transition from a majoritarian to a proportional electoral system. Serbia is 
a single electoral district, with the threshold set at 5 per cent. After 2003, the 
threshold has been abolished for the parties of the national minorities. Serbia has a 
semi-presidential system.( In the 2000–2006 period it had the characteristics of 
polarized pluralism according )  
   Also, the majority principle
56
 for distribution of votes, that had been used in the 
beginning, was replaced later by a proportional system. Ever Party passing a census 
gets into parliament with a number of representatives proportional to a number of 
votes it achieves in elections. By the time, this kind of political system created a 
situation in which several bigger parties were dominant. However, their relations 
were such that no one of them could easily form a stable parliamentary majority.      
  That is why small parties, although of a minor significance independently, became 
key players in final formation of Governments. Therefore, ruling coalitions are a 
normal condition of Serbian political life. On one hand, they are one-step ahead in 
the development of Democracy, but on the other, they are an image of an unstable 
Government, what can be seen at making important decisions 
   The deputies in the National Assembly elect the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia, which, together with the President of the Republic, represents the country‘s 
executive authority. The Judiciary is independent. 
 
    
The President of the Republic is elected for a term of 5 years by direct election 
and has important powers under the Constitution.(the president is the Head of State 
‗‘Republic of Serbia‘‘)  The President is not a member of the National Assembly or 
the government. 
 
Parliament of the Republic of Serbia: The national legislature of Serbia is a 
unicameral assembly of 250 deputies elected through general elections for a term 
of four year.  
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   Most important Political Parties: Democratic Party (DS), Serbian Progressive 
Party (SNS), Serbian Radical Party (SRS),  G17 Plus, Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS), Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), New 
Serbia (NS), League of Vojvodina Social Democrats (LSDV), Sandzak Democratic 
Party (SDP), Coalition for Sandzak, Vojvodina Hungarians Alliance (SVM), Party 
of Democratic Action (PDD), Roma Party (RP), Union of Roma of Serbia (URS). 
   Finally, with respect to the engagement and activity of the parties
57
 on the way 
towards European integrations, we   might define a   conditional difference   
between pro-European   active parties  (DS, G17 Plus, LDP, SPO),     pro-European  
less active parties (DSS, the suspension of association negotiations due to a lack of 
cooperation with The Hague) and inactive parties (SPS, since the 6th Congress of 
2003 determined Serbia joining
58
 the EU) and anti-European parties (SRS). Among 
the relevant parties, the DS and G17 Plus emphasize the importance of Serbia 
joining the EU more than the others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA (SDP) 
   The SDP was founded in April 2002 when the Social Democratic Union and 
Social Democracy (SD) merged. The party was in government as part of the broad 
anti-Milosevic DOS coalition. After the withdrawal of the support to DOS of the 
SDS, the government lost majority and the parliament was dissolved. The party left 
the government with the explanation that they could accept being pragmatic for a 
period during the turbulence and the state of emergency after the murder of 
Djindjic, but it was time to move on. Especially the dominance of the Democratic 
Party in the coalition was a reason to step out of it. As a result, early elections were 
called. 
    Despite the fact that not all members left, the SDP was rightly expected to be too 
small to gain enough votes on their own in the latest elections, which made them 
decide to participate on the list of the liberal party G17 Plus. Since 12 September 
2004 Nebojsa Covic is leading the party. He used to be mayor of Belgrade during 
the Milosevic years. Media speculated about Nebosja Covic entering negotiations 
with Slobodan Milosevic‘s Socialist Party of Serbia to form a leftist party. The 
main obstacle for the SDS is said to be the hardliners in SPP. 
   The SDP became part of the government of Serbia with one minister - Slobodan 
Lalovic  who is Minister of Labour,   Employment and  Social Policy,  two deputy 
ministers and five  assistant   ministers.   The party has is a full member in the 
Socialist International   since  July 2008.  
Party-leader: Nebojsa Covic  
 
 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DS) 
   The DS59 was the first opposition party to be established in Serbia. The party split 
twice in the first years: first a Liberal Party was formed, after that the Democratic 
Party of Serbia (DSS) was founded. In 1996 the party entered into the Zajedno-
coalition with the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Civic Alliance. 
   During the Bosnian war the party was not pacifist and was in favour of Serbian 
intervention in Bosnia to help the secessionist Bosnian-Serbs. However, DS called 
for reforms and the removal of Milosevic. The climax of oppositional activities was 
the 1996 winter demonstrations against Milosevic‘s refusal to accept the local 
election results. After that, disagreements between SPO-leader Draskovic and DS-
leader Djindjic became impossible to overcome and as a result the opposition 
disintegrated. 
   The DS was the largest party in the Democratic Alliance (DOS) that was formed 
in 2000 with the objective to remove Slobodan Milosevic's from power. The party 
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was headed by Zoran Djindjic, Prime Minister from 2000 onwards, until his 
assassination in March 2003, which shocked the world and meant a backlash to 
Serbia‘s democratization. 
   The DOS alliance has disintegrated since 2000, and the defeat of its candidate in 
the third run of Presidential elections in November 2003 was a great blow to the 
remains of the alliance. In the latest parliamentary elections DS ran in a coalition 
with the Civic Alliance of Serbia, the Democratic Center and the Social 
Democratic Union. DS became the third largest party in the Serbian parliament 
with 37 of 250 seats. Since co-operation with the DSS is impossible because of the 
struggle between Djinjic and Kostunica resulting in the break up of DOS, and DSS 
refusal to co-operate with DS, the party stayed out of the government.  
   The role of the DS in opposition is an essential one, since they can form a 
counterforce against the dominant extreme nationalist forces of SPS and SRS and 
provide for necessary majorities on reform proposals.. The Prime Minister of 
Vojvodina is from the DS. The party leader, Boris Tadic, is the President of Serbia, 
and was in February 2008 re-elected for a second term. 
   The DS is a firm supporter of Serbia‘s integration into the European Union and 
co-operation with the ICTY. For Kosovo they stress the importance of the 
standards before the status. Within the DS a liberal and a social democratic wing 
can be distinguished. For some time it was unclear in what direction the party 
would head, but now the party adopted a social democratic orientation, seeking 
contact with parties of the social democratic family all over Europe and officially 
confirming it on the party congress. 
  Currently, the DS is the biggest party in the ruling coalition whilst Mirko 
Cvetkovic of DS is Prime Minister of Serbia. The party has is a full member in the 
Socialist International, since July 2008. 
 Party leader: Boris Tadic  
 
LEAGUE  OF  SOCIAL  DEMOCRATS  IN  VOJVODINA (LSV) 
   The LSV is a multi-ethnic, anti-nationalist, anti-war, social democratic party in 
Vojvodina. Since the founding of the party, the LSV has opposed all war efforts of 
the Serbian and Yugoslav government, has opposed discrimination on ethnic or any 
other ground. In fact, the LSV, and the SDU, are the only parties in Yugoslavia 
who over the years have openly criticized Serbian nationalism and the regime  of  
Milosevic  since   its foundation. 
  By using modern methods of communication, and original means of organizing 
events,  the LSV was   able to attract   crowds of young people.  The LSV was very 
active in organizing anti-war campaigns throughout 1998, anti Milosevic rallies in 
1999 and the actions against the regime in October 2000. 
   The LSV strives for an autonomous, multi-ethnic, and democratic Vojvodina, to 
be reached through decentralization and ‗denationalization‘ of Serbia. The party 
headquarters of the LSV are in Novi Sad, the biggest "opposition" city of Serbia 
during the Milosevic years. Nowadays the city is governed by a mayor from the 
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Radical Party. The party is absent outside Vojvodina, which is the cause for their 
absence in the parliament. They are not able to overcome the 5 per cent threshold. 
  In 2008, LSV formed a pre-election coalition with the DS, G17 Plus and some 
minority parties. LSV has 5 seats in the Serbian Parliament. 
Party leader: Nenad Canak 
 
OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES
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THE  SERBIAN  RADICAL PARTY  (SRS) 
    The SRS was founded in 1991 by Vojislav Seselj and Tomislav Nikolic. The 
current leader, Vojislav Seselj, is awaiting trial at the war crimes tribunal on 
charges of crimes against humanity in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s. The party is 
extreme nationalist and it supports the idea of a Greater Serbia, stretching out from 
Istria to Thessaloniki. Seselj fell out of grace, but during the Kosovo crisis a 
rapprochement between the SPS and the SRS occurred and the SRS returned to the 
Serbian and Federal governments. In the latest elections of May 2008 the party got 
29,5 % of the votes and is the biggest opposition party with 77 seats in the National 
Assembly.  
    Its electoral success, although not as big as in the elections in 2007, can be 
explained by growing nationalist sentiments in Serbia, their promise to engage in 
economic reforms and votes of people who formerly supported the Socialist Party 
of Serbia. The party‘s interim leader, Tomislav Nikolic, dedicated their victory ―to 
Vojislav Seselj and other Serb inmates in The Hague‖. Due to its extremist 
orientation, the party stayed out of government. However since a minority 
government was formed and other parties are also quite nationalist, the SRS has 
major political influence and their proposals have significant chance to be adopted, 
as was shown by the approval of the bill that supports indicted war criminals, in 
March 2004. 
Party leader: Vojislav Seselj  
Interim party leader: Tomislav Nikolic  
 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC  PARTY OF SERBIA (DSS) 
   The DSS was founded in 2001 as a breakaway party from the Democratic 
Coalition (DOS) led by Zoran Djindjic. After the split, the party shifted to the right 
in its political orientation, to become a conservative party advocating liberal 
economic ideas. Party leader Kostunica is known as an anti-Western, anti-US 
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democratic nationalist and supporter of the idea of a Greater Serbia. He is, 
however, famous for his political integrity and favours a democratic Serbia. In the 
2000 September elections, after the removal of Milosevic, Kostunica was elected 
president in the first round. The Western countries hurried to congratulate him and 
assure him of their support. Kostunica accepted their embraces, but was careful to 
keep his distance. He is highly critical of the co-operation with the war crimes 
tribunal in The Hague and favours Serbian nationalist plans like the canonization of 
Kosovo. Party leader: Vojislav Kostunica 
 
 G17 PLUS 
    G17 Plus was founded in December 2002 as a party that grew out of an non-
governmental organization pressing for economic reforms. The party has a liberal 
orientation, and is favoured by the international community for not being 
nationalist and its commitment to reforms. According to the party‘s program the 
mission of the party is ―the creation of a strong economy and stable democracy in 
Serbia, which will become the leader in the Balkans, ready to adopt European 
standards and capable of preserving and protecting the best of its own tradition and 
culture.‖ Economic and institutional reforms, a better life for the citizens of Serbia 
and integration into the European Union are main goals. In addition, social 
protection of the poorest during the transition period is seen as a necessity. The 
party was one of the few parties in favour of ending the State Union with 
Montenegro. 
     The  party  is  currently  member  of  the ruling  coalition  and  the  leader  of   
G17 Plus and  Mladjan Dinkic is Minister of economy and regional development.  
Party leader: Mladjan Dinkic 
SERBIAN  RENEWAL MOVEMENT- NEW SERBIA ( SPO-NS) 
   The SPO was founded in 1990 as a nationalist liberal party, and was throughout 
the1990s together with the Democratic Party, the most influential opposition 
party.According to the SPO‘s programme the party is a nationalist party with a 
liberal, civic and democratic orientation. The party would like to introduce a 
constitutional parliamentary monarchy in Serbia and  emphasizes  the  importance   
of keeping together the state, including Montenegro and Kosovo and the removal 
of international troops. Like Kostunica, SPO favours a canonization of Kosovo.The 
party is  in  favour of becoming a member of the European  Union as soon as 
possible.    
   After loosing in the 2000 elections, an alliance was sought with New Serbia for 
participation in the 2003 elections. New Serbia, a nationalist party with communist 
roots, was founded in 1997 after the 1996/97 protests by a former member of the 
Serbian Renewal Movement, Velimir Ilic. In 2008 parliamentary elections, the 
party formed a pre-election coalition with DSS of Vojislav Kostunica and got 7 
seats in the Parliament.   Party leaders: Vuk Draskovic and Velimir Ilic  
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SOCIALIST PARTY OF SERBIA ( SPS) 
   The SPS was founded in 1990 by Slobodan Milosevic and is the successor to the 
League of Communists. Once Milosevic became President of Serbia, he succeeded 
in strengthening Serbia‘s position at the cost of the Federal institutions. He gained 
power by using a mixture of Serbian nationalist and communist rhetoric. When his 
term as president of Serbia expired, he was elected President of Yugoslavia. Under 
his rule the party controlled state property, police and media, and where the SPS 
lost power, the party of his wife Mira Markovic, Yugoslav Left (JUL) stepped in to 
fill the vacuum.         
    In 2000 it was defeated by DOS and after massive street demonstrations 
Milosevic had to step down. Until his death on Slobodan Milosevic formally 
remained the leader of the party, while he was in the  Hague, being on trail before 
the ICTY. 
   After the death of Milosevic analysts expects that a power struggle may further 
weaken the party The party lost votes in the latest elections, however still has 
considerable political influence since the minority government is dependent on the 
support of SPS and there are other nationalist parties that share interests with SPS. 
  On 4 December 2006, deputy head Ivica Dacic beat his rival Milorad  Vucelic in 
vote for the party's new leadership. Dacic pledged to "continue Milosevic's legacy, 
but also implement changes needed to win support of citizens," He also took a 
hard-line stance on Kosovo. The party is currently in the ruling  coalition and its 
leader,  Ivica Dacic, is deputy of the Prime Minister and Minster of internal affairs.  
Party leader: Ivica Dacic 
 
 
LIBERAL  DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP) 
   On 5 November 2005 Cedomir Jovanovic and several other former members of 
the Democratic Party with links to murdered Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic 
founded the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Jovanovic, who was elected 
chairman, called for a "radical break" with unspecified current political practices 
and for an "open confrontation with the past."  The LDP is represented in the 
parliament of Serbia and Montenegro because one deputy belonging to the 
Democratic Party has already shifted his allegiance to the new group. Party leader:  
Cedomir Jovanovic.  
 
 
 
 
44 
 
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN SERBIA 
    In Serbia there is a particularly deep historical-ethnical cleavage (national-
civic).This cleavage largely marks the political scene of Serbia and slows down 
democratization and europeanization processes.  Slavujevic
61
  reminds us that the 
"horizontal"  line of historical-ethnical cleavage is supplemented by the "vertical" 
dimension. This is about the cleavage between nationalist and civic  orientation 
among representatives of each ethnic group.  Besides,  empirical  findings show 
that  the axis  of the "national-civic" historical-ethnical cleavage and the axis of 
"traditionalism-modernism"cultural-value cleavage do not intersect, but largely 
overlap, with "national" coinciding with "traditionalism" and "civic" with 
"modernism". In Slavujevic's opinion, this leads to a conclusion of synergic effects 
of these two axes of divisions to party grouping. 
   The dominance of symbolic and distributional cleavages in Serbia after 2000 is 
very important. Its major claim is that the May 11 2008 elections, which brought 
on the defeat of the nationalistic bloc, heralded a shift in the domination of type of 
cleavages in Serbia, thereby making the democratic change of the year 2000 
irreversible. As far as concerned  the  consolidation of democracy,  Serbia- in 
contrast to many other post communist countries that already are EU‐members—
has  had rather  different path to democracy. The path was different but eventually 
did not preclude Serbia from getting closer to consolidation of democratic 
institutions. 
  Generally, in most countries in which the communist elite survived, the elite
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first  got transformed and then, so transformed, returned to power to continue to 
implement reforms (with some degree of policy reversals). The very fact that it 
carried on with the reforms is enough to confirm the consolidation of democracy.      
  The  question is if Serbia in 2009 can ‗‘join‘‘   this pattern. It can‘t be given a 
clear answer but after the change     in government in 2000(the fall of Milocevic 
regime-political transition), the parties that made up the opposition that took power 
in October 2000 have been alternating in government until today (mid-  2009). 
   The two major governing parties in 1990‐2000 were in dissatisfaction after the 
2000 elections. After the electoral defeat in September 2000, the Socialists and the 
Radicals recovered, but never fully returned to power after 2000. The Radicals 
were very close to accomplishing that goal, and the Socialists eventually got in the 
government in July 2008 but only as a junior partner. So, despite the fact that there 
were no proper return to power of the elite that supported the nondemocratic 
regime in 1990‐2000, we can yet talk of the two turnover test and the irreversibility 
of the democratic change  that took place in October 2000 in Serbia. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
     In October 2000, a coalition of democratic parties defeated Serbian strongman 
Slobodan Milosevic in presidential elections, overturning a regime that had 
plunged the country into bloody conflicts in the region, economic decline, and 
international isolation in the 1990s. The country‘s new rulers embarked on a 
transition  toward Western democratic and free market standards, but success has 
been uneven. Serbia has held largely free and fair elections, according to 
international observers. A new constitution adopted  in 2006 marked an 
improvement over the earlier, but has some shortcomings, especially  concerning 
the independence of the judiciary
63
. Serbian governments have undertaken 
economic reforms and the country has experienced rapid economic growth in 
recent years, but living standards remain poor for many people. Organized crime 
and corruption remain very serious problems. 
  Serbia faces an important crossroads in its development. It is seeking to integrate 
into the European Union (EU), but its progress has been hindered by a failure to 
arrest remaining indicted war criminals and by tensions with the United States and 
most EU countries over the independence of Serbia‘s Kosovo province. The United 
States and most EU countries have recognized Kosovo‘s independence. Serbian 
leaders sharply condemned the move. 
   The European Union signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
with Serbia on April 29, 2008. It provides a framework for enhanced cooperation 
between the EU and Serbia in a variety of fields, with the perspective of EU 
membership. However, at the insistence of the Netherlands, the implementation of 
provisions of the SAA will not start until war crimes inductee Ratko Mladic is 
transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
   Parliamentary elections were held in Serbia on May 11, 2008. These elections 
showed that the majority of the voters opted for European integration. However, 
difficulties in forming the government in the period after the elections proved that 
Serbian society is still highly divided. The polarization between pro-Europeans and 
traditionalists became so intense that it provided a coalition potential to Milosevic‘s 
Socialist Party of Serbia that even they did not expect. After an exhausting period 
of  negotiations the Socialists decided to join the pro-European bloc, for the time-
being. 
   A result of the electoral loss was the dissolution of the Serbian Radical Party, the 
leading traditionalist force in Serbia. The Radicals, who always came close to 
power but never close enough, finally started to show first signs of defeat. They 
were not only defeated in the elections, they were defeated in depth. The leading 
members left the party and formed a new one. This was definitely a strong blow to  
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the  Radicals and the real impact of this separation will be seen at the next 
elections. Neither of the two  parties will  be able to gather such support as they did 
it in the past. On July 7 2008,  the Serbian parliament approved a new government 
coalition led by pro-Western forces, but which also includes the Socialist Party 
(once led by indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic). 
   Serbia has vowed to take ―all legal and diplomatic measures‖ to preserve Kosovo 
as part of Serbia. Serbia won an important diplomatic victory when the U.N. 
General Assembly voted on October 8, 2008, to refer the question of the legality of 
Kosovo‘s declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice. 
   A decision on the case is not expected for several years. After  taking office, the 
new government sent its ambassadors back to EU countries that recognized 
Kosovo‘s independence, signaling that it does not want to isolate Serbia while 
continuing to oppose Kosovo‘s independence. Serbia agreed to the deployment in 
December 2008 of EULEX, an EU-led law-and-order mission in Kosovo, perhaps 
with a similar purpose
64
. 
  In view of  the changes in  Serbian politics it can be said with  great confidence 
that a renunciation of EU integration is impossible in Serbia today. Although it has 
seemed that Serbia is closer to Russia than to the EU and that it tries to balance 
between these two powers, the policy of keeping one leg in the West and one in the 
East will not be tenable in the long term. Consensus to join the EU seems to exist 
among the political elite in Serbia, but with NATO accession it is quite the 
opposite. Although the Serbian government has approved a security agreement for 
the interchange of information with NATO, the majority citizens are reluctant to 
join NATO. 
   In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO‘s Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
program.PFP   is  aimed at helping countries come closer to NATO standards and 
at promoting their cooperation with NATO. Serbia is not currently seeking NATO 
membership. In January 2009, Serbia warned that NATO‘s role in overseeing the 
new Kosovo Security Force (seen by both Serbia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo 
as a de facto Kosovo army) could have a negative impact on Serbia‘s cooperation 
with the Alliance.  
   The most serious cloud over U.S.-Serbian relations is the problem of Kosovo. 
Serbia sharply condemned U.S. recognition of Kosovo‘s 
independence.Nevertheless, during a May 2009 visit to Belgrade, Vice President 
Joseph Biden stressed strong U.S. support for close ties with Serbia. 
   He said the countries could ―agree to disagree‖ on Kosovo‘s independence. He 
called on Serbia to transfer the remaining war criminals to the ICTY, promote 
reform in neighboring Bosnia, and cooperate with international bodies in Kosovo.  
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  Southern Serbia is a flashpoint. The tensions in southern Serbia between the  
Albanian majority  and the Serbian security apparatus could escalate if the situation 
in northern Kosovo goes in the direction of secession. Another possible crisis area 
is Sandzak. The reasons for the conflict can not be easily determined as well as the 
role of the Serbian government in it. 
   While many obstacles remain, most notably the issues of cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia and the collateral issues 
associated with Kosovo‘s independence, Serbia is making steady progress in 
strengthening its democratic processes and becoming more integrated with the rest 
of Europe and the world. 
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